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Abstract: This article aims to analise how the Brazilian State of Rio Grande do Sul 
(RS) projects its distinctive cultural identity internationally. It does so by identifying the 
cultural elements in the state’s paradiplomacy from 1987 to 2014 through a sequence 
analysis including two elements: RS’s paradiplomatic and cultural institutions; RS’s 
paradiplomatic agenda. Three phases are identified in terms of space given to culture in 
the paradiplomacy institutional framework: expansion (1987-1994); retraction (1995-
2010); expansion (2011-2014). The phases are slightly different in terms of agenda: 
will but lack of means (1987-1990); focus on other issues (1991-2010); construction of 
an incipient agenda (2011-2014). Also, the 2012 actions to structure cultural policy at 
federal and state level can be seen as a factor for the agenda expansion in the last phase. 
However, despite the discourse around the gaúcha identity being present within the state 
and country, the projection further afield remains weak. Generally, the multiple changes 
in institutional framework and agenda show that a long-term project has not been 
decided on. Thus, the resulting policies are highly dependent on each governor’s vision.
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Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é de avaliar como o Estado do Rio Grande do Sul 
(RS), Brasil, projeta internacionalmente a sua identidade cultural singular. Para tanto, 
ele busca identificar os elementos culturais na paradiplomacia do estado de 1987 
a 2014 com uma análise de trajetória composta de dois elementos: as instituições 
paradiplomáticas e culturais do RS; a agenda paradiplomática do RS. São identificadas 
três fases em termos de espaço dado à cultura na estrutura paradiplomática: expansão 
(1987-1994); redução (1995-2010); expansão (2011-2014). As fases relativas à agenda 
são um pouco diferentes: ambição, mas falta de meios (1987-1990); foco em outras 
temáticas (1991-2010); construção de uma agenda incipiente (2011-2014). Além disso, 
as ações conduzidas em 2012 para estruturar as políticas culturais em nível federal 
e estadual podem ser vistas como um fator da expansão da agenda na última fase. 
1 Universidade de Brasília (UnB, Brasília, DF, Brasil).
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Entretanto, apesar do discurso ao redor da identidade gaúcha ser presente dentro do 
estado e em nível nacional, a projeção internacional dele é fraca. De maneira geral, 
as múltiplas mudanças na estrutura institucional e na agenda mostram que um projeto 
de longo prazo não foi estabelecido. Portanto, as políticas resultantes são altamente 
dependentes da visão de cada governador.
Palavras-chave: Paradiplomacia. Cultura. Rio Grande do Sul.
Resumen: El propósito de este artículo es de analizar cómo el Estado de Rio Grande do 
Sul (RS), Brasil, proyecta internacionalmente su identidad cultural. Con este objetivo, 
se busca identificar los elementos culturales de la paradiplomacia del estado de 1987 
a 2014 mediante un análisis de su trayectoria, y en concreto de dos elementos: las 
instituciones paradiplomáticas y culturales de RS y la agenda paradiplomática de 
RS. Se identifican tres fases en términos de espacio dado a la cultura en la estructura 
paradiplomática: expansión (1987-1994); reducción (1995-2010); expansión (2011-
2014). Las fases relativas a la agenda son un poco diferentes: ambición, pero falta 
de medios (1987-1990); enfoque en otros temas (1991-2010); construcción de una 
agenda incipiente (2011-2014). Además, las acciones llevadas a cabo a nivel federal 
y estatal para estructurar las políticas culturales pueden ser vistas como un factor de 
expansión de la agenda en la última fase. Sin embargo, pese a que el discurso sobre 
la identidad gaucha está presente dentro del estado y a nivel nacional, su proyección 
internacional es débil. De manera general, los múltiples cambios en la estructura 
institucional y en la agenda muestran que no se estableció un proyecto de largo plazo. 
Por lo tanto, las políticas resultantes son altamente dependientes de la visión de cada 
gobernador. 
Palabras clave: Paradiplomacia. Cultura. Rio Grande do Sul.
Introduction
Both culture and paradiplomacy are themes which have entered the 
International Relations debate quite late: in the 1990s. Perhaps for this reason, 
they retain a rather peripheral position in this area of study, though their role 
in international relations has been increasingly studied over the past years. 
Generally, the literature on paradiplomacy remains predominantly European, 
focusing mostly on western cases and drawing theories from these specific 
contexts. Based on the acknowledgement of this scarcity of studies originating 
from other parts of the world and on a desire to go beyond the most clear cut 
empirical cases (Québec, the Basque Country, Flanders…), our aim is to make 
a contribution to the emerging Brazilian literature on the subject (Vigevani et 
al., 2004; Milani and Ribeiro, 2011; Bueno, 2012; Salomón and Nunes, 2007) 
studying a Brazilian empirical case. Focusing specifically on the intersection 
between paradiplomacy and culture – another emerging field of study in the 
country – this article aims to analyse the international cultural projection of 
the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul.
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Specifically, the question around which this article is articulated is the 
following: Which cultural elements can be identified in Rio Grande do Sul's 
paradiplomacy? To which extent can we say that this sub-national actor has 
developed a cultural identity which is projected internationally? To answer 
this question, we will conduct an in-depth sequence analysis (Pierson, 2004) 
of the evolution of the state's cultural paradiplomatic apparatus and agenda. 
The period chosen to conduct this analysis is 1987-2014, starting with the 
creation of the first paradiplomatic apparatus in Rio Grande do Sul (from now 
on referred to as RS) and ending in 2014, which corresponds to the end of 
the last completed state governor mandate. The choice of RS stems from the 
strong cultural identity which exists in this state, which makes it an interesting 
case study in terms of political strategy and desire to project this identity 
internationally.
The study of paradiplomacy and its cultural aspects
The rise of paradiplomacy
Having emerged in the 1980s, the phenomenon of the transfer of 
jurisdiction from central governments to sub-national governments and of the 
growing independence and international activity of the latter solidified as a 
field of academic study in the 1990s. As a practice and as a field of study, this 
phenomenon is based on the idea that the ideal decision-making entity is the 
city, or that decisions should be made as locally as possible (Moreno, 2007, 
p. 37).
First labeled as "paradiplomacy" by Panayotis Soldatos (1990) as an 
abbreviation of “parallel diplomacy”, the phenomenon was later given 
various other denominations. The most well-known are “micro-diplomacy” 
(Duchacek et. al., 1988; Duchacek, 1990) and ‘foreign policy of non-central 
governments’ (Aldecoa and Keating, 1999), but others such as multi-level 
diplomacy, city diplomacy, internationalisation of cities, decentralised 
cooperation and international actions of local governments have also been used 
(Gely, 2016).
These multiple denominations show that the field is diverse and suffers 
from a certain lack of unity. This is the result of two factors. Firstly, the field of 
paradiplomacy is profoundly multidisciplinary. Furthermore, most publications 
on the subject are based on empirical studies and the heterogeneity of the cases 
makes it difficult to establish a general theory (Gely, 2016).
The most accepted and all-encompassing definition is certainly the one 
given by Prieto (2004, p. 251; own translation):
354 Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 18, n. 2, p. 351-375, May-Aug. 2018
Paradiplomacy can be defined as the involvement of subnational 
governments in international relations, through the establishment 
of contacts with foreign entities, which can be formal and informal, 
permanent or temporary (‘ad hoc’), with public or private entities, 
with the aim of reaching socio-economic results, as well as any 
external aspect within their jurisdiction.
Based on this general understanding of paradiplomacy, we will define 
our specific object of study: cultural paradiplomacy.
Cultural diplomacy: conceptual dimensions
Cultural activities, goods and services, as recognised in the Unesco’s 
2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, have a double nature: economic, by their commercial value; and 
symbolic, by the identitarian aspects which they bear (Unesco, 2005). Because 
of this double nature, they are powerful foreign policy and diplomacy tools in 
a globalised world (Stoica and Horga, 2016). 
Generally speaking, cultural diplomacy can be defined “in its most 
basic terms as an international actor’s attempt to manage the international 
environment by facilitating cultural transmission across an international 
boundary” (Cull, 2009, p. 53). However, it is useful to dig further and make a 
certain number of additions to this general definition. 
Firstly, based on the multidimensional definition of culture mentioned 
above, cultural diplomacy can be seen as relating to two different realms: the 
economic and the sociopolitical realms. In this sense, international cultural 
projection can be “either about effecting or constraining particular outcomes, 
or about transforming or constituting the identity of the actors and the issues 
themselves” (Singh, 2010, p. 4). 
Secondly, there are some divergences in terms of definition of what 
constitutes cultural diplomacy, making it necessary for us to position 
ourselves in relation to this debate. A first distinction which is made is 
between international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy. Whilst inter- 
national cultural relations include all cultural activities which take place 
beyond national borders, cultural diplomacy is restricted to international 
cultural activities with some form of involvement by public institutions 
(Bélanger, 1994). 
Beyond this first distinction, some authors such as J. M. Mitchell (1986, 
apud Bélanger, 1994) distinguish two types of cultural diplomacy. The first is 
led directly by public institutions and as such, is developed according to foreign 
policy aims. The other is led by private or para-governmental organisations 
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and even though it is inserted within the general foreign policy framework, it 
corresponds to these organisations’ aims. 
In line with Robert Frank (2012), the understanding of cultural diplomacy 
which underlies this article is that there are multiple interactions between the 
public and private sectors in this field: the cultural diplomacy developed by 
public agents depends on the intellectual and artistic production of the civil 
society; whilst private agents involved in international cultural activities often 
rely on help from the state to develop their projects. In this sense, a more 
detailed and practical definition of cultural diplomacy is given by Lessa (2012) 
in the following sentence: “all the actions formulated, oriented, led and funded, 
totally or in part, by the state, whether by its agents or by non-governmental 
partners” (own translation). According to this vision, the two crucial elements 
to define cultural diplomacy are the following: international cultural activities 
and involvement of the state.
Working with a wide definition of cultural diplomacy which includes 
actors from civil society brings us close to the notion of New Public Diplomacy 
which could also be referred to as “collaborative diplomacy” (Riordan, 2005, 
p. 1). The latter is characterised by the involvement, along with governmental 
agents, of non-governmental agents which operate through more agile and 
flexible networks (Riordan, 2005). This type of diplomacy aims to stimulate 
dialogue based on the international exchange of ideas, cultures and people (De 
Lima Júnior, 2015) in an increasingly informed and connected post-modern 
world. Thus, in New Public Diplomacy, cultural activities are given more 
importance than in traditional diplomacy: “In cultural relations as much as in 
the new public diplomacy, the accent is increasingly on engaging with foreign 
audiences rather than selling messages, on mutuality and the establishment 
of stable relationships instead of mere policy-driven campaigns” (Melissen, 
2005, p. 21-22).
Defining cultural paradiplomacy
Cultural diplomacy, generally studied at the national level, can exist 
according to the same logic at the sub-national level. Paradiplomacy, in all its 
different forms, is a “multifunctional vehicle for the promotion of interests and 
identity” (Lecours, 2008, p. 5) and as such, can be used to pursue the same 
purposes as the cultural diplomacy of a nation. 
Paradiplomacy is a multifactorial phenomenon, most often stemming 
from a feeling of disconnection of a community from the central state, for 
economic or for identitarian reasons (and often both) (Sarquís, 2013, apud 
Dávila and Silva, 2016). Amongst paradiplomacy scholars, some – generally 
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those with a constructivist approach – have devoted time to its cultural, 
identitarian, psychological or historical aspects (Dávila; Silva, 2016). Follows 
a brief summary of the predominant thoughts on and classifications of cultural 
and identitarian aspects of paradiplomacy.
Aldecoa and Keating (1999) distinguish three categories of paradiplomatic 
aims: the economic, the political and the cultural aims. The latter encompass 
objectives such as cultural preservation, the establishment of cultural links 
with other countries or regions and activities contributing to the international 
projection of a community’s culture. 
Stéphane Paquin (2004a) also established a classification of 
paradiplomatic activity. His first category, classic paradiplomacy, corresponds 
to actions which enable the international projection of a political vision. The 
second, protodiplomacy, refers to actions aimed at securing independence. 
Finally, identity paradiplomacy corresponds to the construction or reinforcing 
of a minority nation within a multinational state, without pursuing the 
objective of independence. The purpose of this last category of paradiplomacy 
is to secure abroad resources which are scarce internally and to be recognised 
internationally. According to Paquin, nationalism is an undervalued variable 
within the study of paradiplomacy, though it is not the main one. For him, 
economic aims prevail in explaining the development of paradiplomatic 
strategies by sub-national actors (Paquin, 2004b).
Lecours distinguishes three layers of paradiplomacy. First, the economic 
layer, which according to him is strictly focused on the attraction of foreign 
capital and as such is not intertwined with any political or cultural issues. 
Second, he distinguishes the layer concerned with cooperation, which can 
be cultural, technical, educational or of another nature. This layer involves a 
more multidimensional approach. Finally, the third layer is linked to political 
considerations. Often, though not always, this implies the projection by the 
community in question of an identity which is different from the one projected 
by the national state or a desire for political independence. These three layers 
can be combined in an actor’s paradiplomacy and they are non-exclusive 
(Lecours, 2008). 
Contrary to what most theorists of paradiplomacy see as the most 
important variable to determine the level of international projection of 
regions – federalism –, Lecours and Moreno (2001) see substate or stateless 
nationalism as the most important factor to qualitatively account for this 
phenomenon. Though not a necessary condition for the development of 
regional paradiplomacy, nationalism gives the region a reason to develop three 
elements which are also fundamental to the development of paradiplomacy: 
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identity/nation building; political-territorial mobilisation; and promotion of 
regional interests. 
They outline a number of processes which contribute to the development 
of identity construction or consolidation (the first element), in varying 
measures depending on the cases: cultural change, institutional development, 
socioeconomic transformations and political context/competition. Beyond 
these four factors, they highlight the crucial importance of the discursive 
aspect: the region presenting itself as an entity (Lecours and Moreno, 2001).
The third element, the definition and promotion of regional interests, 
generally encompasses two dimensions: the development of an ideological/
political discourse; and the promotion and politicisation of a cultural 
distinctiveness. According to the authors, “cultural defence and promotion 
tend to be the most important issues of paradiplomacy because they are central 
to its underlying force, nationalism. Paradiplomacy extends the domestic 
struggles of nationalist movements for cultural preservation into international 
politics” (Lecours and Moreno, 2001, p. 3).
The following table aims to summarise visually the three aforementioned 
classifications:
Table 1. Classifications of paradiplomatic activity






1. Economic aim 1. Classic paradiplomacy 1. Economic layer
2. Political aim 2. Protodiplomacy 2. Cooperation layer
3. Cultural aim 3. Identitarian paradiplomacy 3. Political layer
Classification based  
on aims
Classification based  
on aims
Classification based on  
categories of issues
Table elaborated by the author based on: Dávila and Silva, 2016; Lecours, 2008; Paquin 2004a, 2004b.
Distinguishing themselves from these three authors who analise 
paradiplomacy either in terms of aims or categories of issues, Dávila and 
Silva (2016) develop an analysis of paradiplomacy based on the motivations 
of the actors. According to them, a wide range of reasons can lead to the 
development of paradiplomatic actions by a subnational government, such as 
the desire to project an image internationally, local development or identitarian 
considerations. For them, the identitarian aspect of paradiplomatic action is not 
to be found in the final aims of the actors but in the incentives which push them 
to develop the action. “What is most common is for the identitarian element 
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to justify any form of rapprochement between the parts and the decision 
making it implies; this way, in the cases in which identity doesn't constitute 
the incentive, it is at least used to disguise and legitimise it” (Dávila and Silva, 
2016, p. 94, own translation).
Finally, Prieto (2010) argues that as is the case with diplomacy, 
paradiplomacy has two dimensions: instrumental and symbolic. The first 
corresponds to objectives such as the attraction of foreign investment, the 
promotion of the country or the access to multilateral forums; whilst the second 
corresponds to objectives such as cultural and political promotion. We would 
argue that, on the basis of cultural activities’ double nature (economic and 
symbolic) mentioned previously, cultural paradiplomacy can be considered 
both instrumental and symbolic.
As a conclusion, one can see that it is very difficult to categorise cultural 
paradiplomacy on the basis of existing categories. As argued by Singh (2010), 
it relates both to the economic realm and the socio-political realm as it has an 
instrumental as well as a symbolic dimension (Prieto, 2010). We would argue 
that culture can be found in the three layers of paradiplomacy identified by 
Lecours (2008). As highlighted by Aldecoa and Keating (1999) and Paquin 
(2004a, 2004b), it can be an aim. Furthermore, it can sometimes constitute an 
incentive (Dávila and Silva, 2016) and most often, though not always, it has 
links with nationalism (Lecours and Moreno, 2001).
Methodology
On the basis of this statement, the perspective adopted here is of 
seeing culture as a paradiplomatic tool, including in the notion of cultural 
paradiplomacy all cultural actions of an international nature which receive 
some form of support from a subnational government. This definition allows 
us to consider jointly international actions corresponding to all types of aims 
and possibly constituting a motivation, as long as the tool which is used is 
culture. It also avoids going into considerations around nationalism, which 
is a debated notion for the empirical case studied here. Furthermore, it 
acknowledges the incipient nature of cultural policies and paradiplomacy in 
Brazil, which implies that the use of culture most often is not the result of a 
structured strategy based on long term goals and partnerships, but are the result 
of ad hoc projects.
This analysis will be based on the framework in two parts used by 
Salomón and Nunes (2007) in their study of the paradiplomacies of the state of 
Rio Grande do Sul and the city of Porto Alegre: 1. Analysis of the institutional 
framework for paradiplomacy; 2. Analysis of the paradiplomatic agenda. It 
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will be adapted to the specifics of cultural paradiplomacy, with an attempt to 
identify an additional element seen as crucial by Lecours and Moreno (2001) 
in identity construction: the presence of a discursive aspect.
Cultural paradiplomacy: institutional context in Brazil
The institutional context of paradiplomacy
Brazil's 1988 constitution, which prevails currently, does not 
institutionalise paradiplomacy. A number of specific responsibilities are 
transferred to subnational governments and there is no constitutional rule 
forbidding them to establish international activities (Milani and Ribeiro, 
2011). Furthermore, the central state recognises a number of decentralised 
cooperation networks, such as Mercocidades within the Mercosul. However, 
officially, all international action remains a prerogative of the central state: 
“Art. 21. Is a prerogative of the Federal State: I – to maintain relations with 
foreign States and take part in international organisations” (Brasil, 1988, 
art. 21, own translation) and thus Brazilian paradiplomacy is maintained 
within “unlawful practices” (“situações irregulares” Vigevani, 2004, p. 29). 
Additionally, the Brazilian system concentrates financial resources in the 
Federal State, making it difficult for subnational governments to increase their 
remit and actions (Branco, 2007).
The institutional context of cultural policies
Though the existence of cultural policies in Brazil dates back from the 
1930s (Oliveira, 2012), the cooperation between the different federal entities 
in terms of cultural policy was only officially established in 2012 through a 
modification of the Brazilian constitution1 which initiated the National Cultural 
System. This system, “organised in a collaborative manner, in a decentralised 
and participative way, establishes a process of joint management and promotion 
of cultural public policies” (Brasil, 1988, art. 216-A, § 1, own translation).
Amongst others, this system included the following principles: “IV 
– cooperation between federal bodies, public and private cultural agents”; 
“V – integration and interaction in the carrying out of policies, programmes, 
projects and actions”; “VIII – autonomy of the federal bodies and of civil 
society institutions”; “XI – coordinated and agreed decentralisation of 
management, resources and actions”; “XII – progressive increase of the public 
budgets dedicated to culture” (Brasil, 1988, art. 216-A, §1, own translation). 
 
1 With the PEC 71/2012 which added article 216-A to the Federal Constitution.
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It also determines that “The States, the Federal District and the Municipalities 
will organise their own cultural systems in dedicated laws” (Brasil, 1988, 
art. 216-A, §4, own translation). Generally, it officialised the importance of 
culture as a public policy and the independence of different public bodies in 
implementing their own policies and projects in that field. As a consequence 
of this law and with the help of the Ministry of Culture, a number of Brazilian 
states,2 including Rio Grande do Sul, developed state cultural plans (planos 
estaduais de cultura).
Case study: the cultural paradiplomacy of the  
state of Rio Grande do Sul
Institutional framework for cultural paradiplomacy
Paradiplomacy framework: 1987-1994
In terms of international relations, the Rio Grande do Sul state (from now 
on referred to as RS) was pioneer. In 1987, it was the second Brazilian state 
to establish an administrative framework for the state’s international actions 
(Bueno, 2012; Ferreira, 2015b; Salomón and Nunes, 2007).
It was under Pedro Simon’s (1987-1990, PMDB [Partido do Movimento 
Democrático do Brasil]) leadership in RS that the Seai (Special Secretariat 
for International Affairs [Secretaria Especial de Assuntos Internacionais]) 
was created. It had the following attributions: advise the governor on 
relations with other countries, most importantly those of the La Plata basin, 
and with international organisations; supervise and guide state government 
administrations in terms of international relations; raise funds and attract 
investments; and provide consultancy for the private sector. It was subdivided 
into the following departments: 1 – International cooperation; 2 – Private 
investments; 3 – Latin American integration, which itself was subdivided 
into a section dedicated to integration and another one to cultural cooperation 
(Salomón and Nunes, 2007). One can therefore see that from the start, RS’ 
international strategy included cultural preoccupations in its very framework, 
before the Mercosul (and the Mercosul Cultural) had even been created.
Alceu de Deus Collares (1991-1994, PDT [Partido Democrático 
Trabalhista]) maintained and developed the Seai. In the International 
Cooperation Department were created different Technical Cooperation 
sections: International Cooperation; Cooperation with Developing Countries; 
2 Acre, Amapá, Bahia, Ceará, Distrito Federal, Goiás, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraíba, 
Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul, Rondônia, Roraima, Santa Catarina, 
Sergipe, Tocantins.
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Cooperation with Partner-States. The Business Department was given an 
International Events section and a Business Cooperation and Promotion 
section. Finally, the Latin American integration department was separated 
into an Information and Documentation section; a Border Issues section; a 
Cultural Integration section and a Latin-American Studies section (Salomón 
and Nunes, 2007). Still, we can see that cultural issues had a dedicated section 
and that there was a strong focus on Latin America.
Paradiplomacy framework: 1995-2010
Antônio Britto (1995-1998, PMDB) closed down the Seai and created 
the Sedai (Development and International Affairs Secretariat [Secretaria do 
Desenvolvimento e dos Assuntos Internacionais]) which fused the Secretariats 
for International Affairs and for Industry and Business. This new secretariat no 
longer dealt with international issues in general: it focused on the inclusion of 
RS into international markets, with a focus on Mercosul (Salomón and Nunes, 
2007). Initially, the Sedai had two departments: Latin American integration; 
International cooperation and business. In 1996, they were fused into a sole 
department called Department for International Affairs and Latin American 
Integration [Departamento de Assuntos Internacionais e de Integração 
Latino Americana – DIN], itself subdivided into the following five sections: 
1 – Latin American Integration; 2 – International Cooperation; 3 – International 
Business; 4 – International Business Networks; 5 – Consular Relations. Also, 
in 1995, the Itamaraty [Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] opened a 
regional office in RS, as it did in other Brazilian states.
Olívio Dutra (1999-2002, PT [Partido dos Trabalhadores]) kept the 
structure established by his predecessor, but changed the five sections to two: 
1 – International Business; 2 – International Affairs. Regional integration came 
back onto the agenda with the creation of a Special Office for Mercosul affairs, 
but it was extinguished after less than a year (Salomón and Nunes, 2007). One 
can see that in these last two administrations, the administrative framework 
shifted to focus largely on economic issues. Though the Latin-American region 
remained a priority, it was more in terms of trade than in terms of integration.
Under Germano Rigotto's mandate (2003-2006, PMDB), it is interesting 
to note that the opposition between the party under power in RS and in the 
federal state was reversed, with the PMDB now leading RS and the election of 
president Lula (PT) at the head of the federal state (Ferreira, 2015b).
Rigotto maintained the division of the Department for International 
Affairs and Latin American Integration into the two sections created by his 
predecessor. However, under allegations of excessive debt, the action was 
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restrained back to economic affairs and the number of teams within the sections 
was reduced. The first was composed of the International Fairs sector and the 
Exporter Room, a service in support of exporters. The second section was 
subdivided into International Cooperation; Consular Relations; International 
Governmental missions; and Latin American Affairs (Salomón and Nunes, 
2007). Out of six programmes carried out during this period, only one is 
not strictly focused on trade: the Integrations and International Cooperation 
Programme3 (Ferreira, 2015b).
Under Yeda Crusius’ mandate (2007-2010, PSDB [Partido da Social 
Democracia Brasileira]), the state’s framework for international actions made 
an even clearer turn towards economic actions. The Sedai was subdivided 
into four departments: Department for International affairs, which integrated 
a few responsibilities in terms of international political activities, along 
with economic ones; and the Departments for business development; for the 
promotion of investments; and the Sales Board whose attributions were all 
strictly economic.4
Paradiplomacy framework: 2011-2014
With the arrival of Tarso Genro (2011-2014, PT), significant changes 
were made to the paradiplomacy institutional framework of RS. The Sedai 
was closed down and the state’s international relations were envisaged in a 
horizontal way for the first time, without a secretariat dedicated to international 
relations. Each secretariat was given responsibility for international actions 
within its remit, with support from the newly created Acri (Advisory Board for 
Cooperation and International Relations [Assessoria de Cooperação e Relações 
Internacionais]), which was attached to the Governor’s cabinet. The Acri’s role 
was to ensure the coherence of international actions led by the secretariats, on 
the basis of state government guidelines. It also got involved in all international 
activities involving the Governor as well as all the international receptions 
organised by the secretariats, with the intention of increasing homogeneity. 
The innovative framework proved quite fruitful and had the added benefit of 
enabling civil servants from different areas to develop international relations 
skills (Ferreira, 2015a).
3 The complete list of programmes is as follows: Capacitação para a Competitividade Empresarial 
(PCCE); Cooperação Empresarial e Inovação (PCI); Atração de Investimentos (Proain); Acesso 
ao Crédito (Peac); Exporta/RS; Programa de Integração e Cooperação Internacional (PIC).
4 Lei 45.673. 23th May, 2008 <www.al.rs.gov.br/filerepository/repLegis/arquivos/DEC%20
45.673.pdf> (6th Dec. 2016).
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Brief summary of the cultural framework
In order to understand and draw a full picture of the international 
projection of RS’s culture as part of its paradiplomacy, it is important to 
briefly expose the context for cultural production within the state. The first 
state cultural institutions were created in the 1950s, amongst which it is 
worth mentioning the Cultural Division and the Institute for Traditions and 
Folklore. The 1980s were a decade in which the protection and promotion of 
regional traditions rose considerably, along with cultural industries linked to 
the gaúcho5 way of life. It is also in the 1980s that the first programmes aiming 
to highlight the Italian and German influences were created within the state 
(Pinto, 2011).
During the Simon administration, the Cultural Development Council 
[Conselho de Desenvolvimento da Cultura – Codec] was created. Its main aim 
was to develop a cultural policy which would enable the closer integration of 
the La Plata basin countries, along with the promotion of the gaúcho identity 
and of international cultural exchange (Pinto, 2011). One can identify a 
coherence with Simon’s general international relations framework, which 
aimed to include culture and focused on the La Plata basin region.
In 1996, a ‘Lei de Incentivo à Cultura’6 was created for the state of RS with, 
amongst its various objectives: value the way of life and cultural production of 
RS; promote the exchange and circulation of cultural activities and products 
from RS to other Brazilian states and internationally (Pinto, 2011). However, 
in contradiction with this last aim, the amounts given to cultural projects via 
this mechanism are to be spent within the state of RS, which restricts their use 
for cultural paradiplomacy actions.
It is worth mentioning that the Secretariat for Tourism’s strategic plan for 
2007-2010 focuses on gaúcho culture as one of the focal points of the state’s 
touristic planning. This valuing of culture within the touristic policies was 
structured around two lines: 1- Promotion of the European heritage of the state; 
2- Actions around the valuing of gaúcho culture (Pinto, 2011).
Finally, as mentioned previously, RS, along with various other states, 
created a state culture plan in 2012 following the general structuring of the 
cultural sector by the federal state in 2012 with the elaboration of the National 
Cultural Plan.
5 Inhabitant of the State of Rio Grande do Sul or person carrying the culture associated to the 
state.
6 System which funds cultural actions through tax credits.
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Summary of the evolution of RS’ framework for cultural paradiplomacy
Follows a table summarising the evolution of the institutional framework 
for the implementation of international actions by the state, highlighting the 
institutional bodies through which international cultural actions could be 
implemented:
Table 2. Evolution of RS’s paradiplomatic and cultural institutional framework
Mandate Governor Party Institutional structure / IR Institutional structure /culture




3. Latin American integration 
integration; cultural cooperation
Cultural Development Council 
(Codec)
• integration of the La Plata 
basin countries 
• promotion of the gaúcho identity 
• international cultural exchange
1991-1994 Alceu de Deus 
Collares
PDT Seai








international events; business 
cooperation and promotion
3. Latin American integration 
department 
information & documentation; 
border issues; cultural 
integration; Latin-American 
studies
1995-1998 Antônio Britto PMDB [1995-1996]
Sedai (Development and 
International Affairs Secretariat)
1. Latin American integration




Department for International 
Affairs and Latin American 
Integration
Latin American integration; 
international cooperation; 
international business; 
international business networks; 
consular relations
State Lei de Incentivo à Cultura 
(1996)
continue
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Mandate Governor Party Institutional structure / IR Institutional structure /culture
1999-2002 Olívio Dutra PT Sedai 
Department for International 
Affairs and Latin American 
Integration
1. International Business 
2. International Affairs





Department for International 
Affairs and Latin American 
Integration
1. International Business 






missions; Latin American Affairs
2007-2010 Yeda Crusius PSDB Sedai
1. Department for International 
affairs
2. Department for business 
development
3. Department for the promotion 
of investments
4. Sales Board
2011-2014 Tarso Genro PT Acri (Advisory Board for 
Cooperation and International 
Relations)
State Cultural Plan (2012)
(1) Closed down in 2000.
Table elaborated by the author based on: Ferreira, 2015a; 2015b; Salomón and Nunes, 2007; Pinto, 2011.
Analysing the evolution of the institutional framework for paradiplomacy 
in RS brings us to a certain number of conclusions. Firstly, the framework for 
international actions changed a lot throughout the different mandates which 
were analysed here, showing that the state government is still looking for 
a functioning long-term formula (Salomón and Nunes, 2007). Secondly, it 
shows us how international actions in RS are highly dependent on the interests, 
vision and actions of each governor. 
Finally, our sequence analysis brings us to distinguish three phases. In 
the first phase, going from 1987 to 1995, RS’ paradiplomacy was carried out 
by the Seai, which gave significant institutional space to cultural questions 
Table 2 (continued)
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(not entering into considerations around effectivity). Drawing parallels with 
the institutionalisation of the cultural field in RS shows that a discourse around 
the use of culture for integration with La Plata basin neighbours was also 
present. In the second phase, going from 1996 to 2011, the span of the state’s 
paradiplomacy was reduced to focus more and more on economic issues, 
setting cultural ones aside. The third phase started in 2011 and takes us to the 
end of our period of study, 2014. This phase was characterised by institutional 
innovation with a new framework which left space for international actions in 
all sectors of the state’s activity, including cultural issues.
Cultural paradiplomacy agenda
The question of nationalism
In line with Lecours’ argument that the most important element influencing 
the existence of paradiplomacy of an identitarian nature is nationalism, it is 
important to consider this question for our case. Rio Grande do Sul, with its 
past marked by events such as the Farroupilha Revolution (1835-1845) and 
the Federalist Revolution (1893-1895) and with its remains of contemporary 
regionalist discourse from part of the population, is a region of Brazil where 
the question of the characterisation and projection of an identity is posed quite 
strongly. 
The gaúchos, in general terms, have a strong cultural identity linked to 
historical, cultural and territorial aspects which have created in them a specific 
relationship to the local and the national: a distancing from the national – 
and the Brazilian ‘other’ – and an exacerbated attachment to the local 
(Luvizotto, 2003). Further than this, there is debate as to whether this distinct 
identity can be classified as regionalism with serious separatist ambitions. 
According to Matsumoto (2011), the formation of the Brazilian state happened 
without a segmentation comparable to the ones which can be found in states 
such as Spain or Canada. Though very diverse, its population presents an 
identitarian homogeneity. Milani and Ribeiro (2011, p. 32) also conclude 
their study of the paradiplomacy of Brazilian cities saying that they “do not 
call ethno-national belonging into question. Emancipation exists, but only 
partially, and not irrespective of the federative pact and the contradictory (but 
sustained) role of the nation-state in Brazil”. According to Matsumoto (2011), 
there aren’t Brazilian cases of paradiplomacy which are based on identity 
arguments and in RS, this phenomenon is marginal. However, despite this 
initial diagnosis, when testing the causal relation between geographic location 
and the development of paradiplomatic activity, Matsumoto found that the 
localisation of a municipality within the RS state had a positive correlation 
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with the existence of an international relations institutional framework within 
city councils. Therefore, even though the question of the significance of 
the separatist movement in RS is debatable, one can see that the distinctive 
and strong identity which exists in the region is a variable which influences 
paradiplomacy and is therefore interesting to be taken into account.
Cultural paradiplomacy agenda 1987-1990:  
a will, but reduced means
During the Simon administration, the main motivation of the state 
government was integration with Southern Cone neighbours, from 1987 and 
even more so after the creation of the Mercosul in 1991. Most actions were 
focused on political negotiations, development of borders and of infrastructure 
and cultural and academic exchange (Nunes, 2005). Follows a list of some of 
the actions which were developed at that time and which illustrate this focus: 
creation of the State Commission for the Integrated Development of the Border 
[Comissão Estadual para o Desenvolvimento Integrado da Fronteira – Cedif]; 
of the Mercosul steering committee [Coordenadoria do Mercosul]; of the 
Border Committees [Comitês de Fronteira]; of the Codesul-Crecenea Litoral 
[Conselho de Desenvolvimento e Integração Sul (Brazil); Comissão Regional 
de Comércio Exterior do Nordeste e Litoral (Argentina)] governor forum; and 
of ten Thematic Integration Groups [Grupos de Integração Temática – GIT] 
of which one was dedicated to culture (Salomón and Nunes, 2007). Alongside 
initiatives at the border with Argentina and within the South Cone, actions were 
developed in the USA, Spain and Japan. In the latter, the twinning programme 
with the Shiga province included a specific programme dedicated to culture 
and is the longest standing and most prolific programme of the sort to date. 
Despite these ambitions, the downside was the nonexistence of a dedicated 
budget or staff within the Seai, which limited effectiveness (Nunes, 2005).
Cultural diplomacy agenda 1991-2010:  
an absence of political and cultural planning
During the Collares administration, there wasn’t a particular focus on 
international activities but the structure of the Seai was maintained and slightly 
amplified. The focus was on commercial promotion, promotion of international 
investments and economic integration within the Mercosul. Academic 
cooperation programmes were abandoned and the Seai remained without a 
dedicated budget and unqualified staff (Nunes, 2005). Generally, what can 
be said about this period is that there were wide ambitions, which included 
cultural aspects – mostly within the Cone Sul and twin city partnerships, and 
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more during Simon's mandate than during Collares's – but limited means, 
which reduced the institution’s effectiveness.
The change from the creation of the Sedai under Britto’s mandate was 
an increase in the institution’s capacities for action, allied with a reduced 
scope (Salomón and Nunes, 2007), the new organisation being almost entirely 
focused on economic issues (Nunes, 2005). Various forums and city twinning 
programmes established during the Simon administration were abandoned. 
Less actions can therefore be highlighted in terms of cultural paradiplomacy 
from the time when the Sedai was created, except to say that during the Dutra 
administration, despite the organisation’s still pregnant focus on economic 
issues, the institution’s remit was slightly widened to include some actions 
around technical and scientific cooperation (Ferreira, 2015b).
During the Rigotto and Crusius administrations, the focus of RS in terms 
of international actions was mainly economic. One cannot say that they were 
exclusively economic as some relations were maintained with foreign states 
and with international organisations, but the lack of an international political 
plan is visible (Ferreira, 2015a, p. 9) and the secretariat’s preoccupation with 
maintaining the level of international projection of RS was minimal (Ferreira, 
2015b).
One initiative which is worth mentioning is the signature during the 
Crusius administration of an agreement with the Italian region of Friuli 
Venezia Giulia in terms of technical-educational cooperation, based on past 
immigration of Italians from that region to RS (Ferreira, 2015a). Secondly, the 
Codesul, of which Crusius was president in 2007-2008, was reactivated during 
this period. In 2008, during the tenth meeting of Codesul-Crenecea Litoral 
governors, the Porto Alegre Charter [Carta de Porto Alegre] was signed. In it, 
governors reaffirmed their common interest in developing the integration of 
the region in various fields, including cultural and touristic integration with 
the objective of “strengthening the concept of South American citizenship” 
(Ferreira, 2015a, p. 11). However, one can say that the few cooperation actions 
which were developed during that time were based on sporadic interests rather 
than a significant component within a plan for the international relations of the 
state (Ferreira, 2015a).
Cultural diplomacy agenda 2011-2014:  
emergence of a cultural discourse
The arrival of Tarso Genro at the head of the RS state in 2011 marked the 
beginning of a new phase. Besides the change in terms of institutional frame- 
work mentioned previously, we can identify three changes in terms of agenda.
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Firstly, there was a diversification of the areas of involvement of the 
state. Based on the fact that economic paradiplomacy had been consolidated 
by various previous governors, the Genro administration established a new 
framework in which all international actions would now be developed 
incorporating three aspects: economic, political-institutional and cultural 
(Núñez, 2014). Cultural cooperation was put forward as a way of making 
international relations about integration between populations, being a 
“fundamental dimension in order to establish relationships and identitarian 
bonds with the people of the countries with which RS is in relation” (Núñez, 
2014, p. 51). 
In 2012, a cooperation mission was organised in France, with the 
president and the Minister of Higher Education and Research. Exchanges were 
established in the following areas: public policies, education, environment, 
culture, science and technology. Existing cooperation agreements were 
developed, with Manitoba (Canada); with Shiga (Japan) in the cultural and 
environmental areas; and with Chungnam-Do (South Korea) in the science 
and technology area (Ferreira, 2015a). 
A second element which can be identified is the intention of projecting 
an image of RS internationally (Ferreira, 2015a). This is clear in Genro’s 
campaign slogan, “Rio Grande do Sul, do Brasil e do Mundo” (Núñez, 2014, 
p. 50), which expresses clearly a desire, at least rhetoric, to place the state 
within a larger international framework. According to Núñez, this change of 
perspective also corresponded to the desire to follow, at the subnational level, 
the new international protagonist role which Brazil was taking on at the time. 
The third element which was developed during Genro’s mandate 
was cooperation and integration within the South Cone region. A cultural, 
educational and social exchange programme was established with Uruguay. 
Following a cooperation project with Argentina, the Mercosul Museum of 
Human Rights was created in Porto Alegre with the additional support of 
Uruguay. Programmes for the development of the borders were also intensified 
(Ferreira, 2015a).
According to Ramos (2014), this diversification of areas of action is 
relative. She argues that economic relations remained the principal action 
front in Genro's administration; that actions in other fields were led in the same 
countries as in previous governments (mainly the South Cone countries) and 
that economic interests can be found behind actions in other areas. Though we 
agree with her diagnosis, we have to disagree with her conclusions. Though 
economic relations may have remained pregnant within RS’s international 
actions, the existence of some (natural) continuity in terms of economic 
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paradiplomacy and in terms of partner countries does not nullify the actions 
which were led in other fields. Our diagnosis is that along with some elements 
of continuity in terms of economic paradiplomacy and partner countries, some 
incursions were made into new areas of action, amongst which the cultural 
field; a discourse emerged in terms of the international projection of the state; 
and initiatives around regional cooperation and integration were resumed 
following various mandates nearly exclusively focused on economic relations. 
Summary of the evolution of RS’s cultural paradiplomatic agenda
Follows a table summarising the evolution of RS’s international relations 
agenda:
Table 3. Evolution of RS’s paradiplomatic agenda
Mandate Governor Party IR Priorities Main partners
1987-1990 Pedro Simon PMDB • Regional integration
• Border and infrastructure 
development





1991-1994 Alceu de Deus 
Collares
PDT • Economic relations
• Regional integration
South Cone countries














PMDB • Economic relations 
• Regional integration
South Cone countries
Other partners: ad hoc




Other partners: ad hoc










Chungnam- Do (South Korea)
Table elaborated by the author based on: Nunes, 2005; Salomón and Nunes, 2007; Ferreira, 2015a; 
2015b; Núñez, 2014.
From this historical analysis of RS’s international relations agenda, we 
can identify an absence of long-term planning, actions being developed in an 
ad-hoc way by each government (Nunes, 2005) and corresponding more to 
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government development policies than to a proper state development policy 
(Ferreira, 2015a).
Going beyond this statement, we can identify three phases in terms of the 
existence or non-existence of a cultural aspect within the paradiplomacy of the 
state. The first one (1987-1990) is characterised by an ambitious agenda which 
included some cultural aspects, mostly focused on Latin America, but the lack 
of financial and staffing structure meant that actions didn’t reach the level 
of ambitions projected. The second phase (1991-2010) is characterised by a 
focus on economic relations, which meant that culture was virtually absent 
from RS’s paradiplomacy. The third phase (2011-2014) is characterised by 
a diversification of the paradiplomatic agenda which brought back cultural 
questions and by the will to project a stronger image of RS internationally. The 
presence of a discursive element around the international cultural projection 
of the RS state can only be identified in the last phase. 
Conclusions
As a general conclusion to our study based on the sequence analysis of 
RS’s use of culture as a paradiplomatic tool, we want to make the following 
points. 
In terms of space given to culture within the institutional framework 
dedicated to paradiplomacy, we have identified a phase of expansion (1987-
1994), followed by a phase of retraction (1995-2010), followed by another 
phase of expansion (2011-2015). 
In terms of agenda, the dividing of the phases is slightly different: a 
phase of will tampered by a lack of means (1987-1990), followed by a phase 
of focus on questions other than culture (1991-2010), followed by a phase 
of construction of an incipient cultural paradiplomatic agenda and discourse 
(2011-2015). 
We have seen that although a discursive element around the gaúcha 
identity is definitely present in RS at least since the 1980s, this identity is 
present mostly within the state and projected in the rest of the country. The 
projection of this identity further afield is not very strong, probably due to a 
lack of institutional structure supporting this.
Finally, we can say that the emergence of a state projection of a cultural 
nature in the last governor mandate studied here was probably due both to 
factors of a regional nature identified previously and to factors of a national 
nature. In 2012, the establishment of a national framework for culture pushed 
many states, amongst which RS, to establish their own cultural frameworks 
and to perceive the importance of culture as a public policy. 
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The conclusion of the mandate of RS’ last governor José Ivo Sartori 
in 2018 will tell us whether these initial measures in terms of cultural 
paradiplomacy marked the real development of long-term policies or whether 
they constituted ones of the many oscillations in RS’ tentative cultural 
paradiplomacy initiatives.
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